OT that still relies heavily on the UK government and electorate for assurances of security, in the face of diplomatic pressure from Argentina. While Islander youth reflected on how their views about geopolitics and security might be considered marginal, relative to those who directly experienced geopolitical events in the Falklands during the second half of the twentieth century, the paper illustrates the multiple ways they can act as agents of (in)security.
Introduction
In September 2015 the Falkland Islands Government (FIG) launched an initiative to showcase the voices of its citizens to an international audience using social media. The #MyVoiceMatters campaign consists of short video clips or photographs posted on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube through which islanders aim to, 'dispel some of the mistruths circulated by the Government of Argentina and highlight that the people of the Falkland Islands are the key stakeholders in their future' (Mercopress, 2015) . Notwithstanding the interesting creative citizen diplomacy embedded in these examples, I
would like to use the #MyVoiceMatters campaign as a point of departure to make several arguments about conceptualisations of security in relation to British OTs like the Falkland Islands. Firstly, the campaign places an emphasis on the perspectives of citizens, which are sometimes contextualised and framed by the FIG to make specific diplomatic points. This is in stark contrast to academic writing about security and geopolitics of the Falkland Islands which has seldom presented the perspectives of the people living there (although see Dodds, 2002; Pinkerton, 2008) . Instead, it typically refers to the Islands using terms like 'strategic gateway', setting up debates about the security of the Falkland Islands in relation to other British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctica (Dodds, 2012 (Dodds, , 2013 Dodds & Hemmings, 2014) . These contributions have tended to theorise security of the Islands from a formal and practical geopolitical perspective (see Basham, 2015) , undoubtedly essential for understanding how governments are crafting foreign policy (Kuus, 2013) . What these accounts underplay and overlook, however, is how citizens understand and experience security (and decisions that are made under its rubric), and how they might actively respond.
Secondly, then, the Twitter campaign is illustrative of how citizens need to be considered more explicitly in understandings of security; Falkland Islanders experience foreign policy decisions and domestic political discourse (emanating from Argentina, the UK and beyond) in intimate ways and can creatively respond to insecurities caused by them alongside or independent of the FIG (Philo, 2014, p. 288) . The perspectives of youth, when compared with those of older generations of Falklands Islanders, reveal markedly different responses and emotions in relation to their respective experiences of (in)security. For older Islanders who could remember the 1960s and 70s when Argentina and the UK entered into sovereignty negotiations against their expressed wishes (see González, 2013) , more conflictual relations with Argentina have provided a sense of certainty and ontological security (Innes & Steele, 2014; Kinnvall, 2002; Mitzen, 2006; Rumelili, 2015a) . The 1982 war, its aftermath and more recent diplomatic tensions have seen the UK firmly committed to defending the Falklands and the Islanders' wish to remain as a British OT (Dodds & Pinkerton, 2013) . Islander youth, while appreciative of these commitments from the UK and the security they provided, responded in different ways to the presence of a more hostile government in Argentina. The paper contributes to existing scholarship on ontological security calling for greater sensitivity to generational difference in how citizens frame geopolitical relations and their associated everyday experiences of (in)security.
These themes are explored here by drawing on ethnographic research undertaken in the Falkland Islands and the UK, presenting empirical data from interviews conducted with youth (aged 19-27) and adults from the Falkland Islands between 2011 and 2015. All of the citizens interviewed were extremely conscious of postcolonial power relations with the UK, given that they rely on promises of responsibility from this larger collective for their security. Despite this, their perspectives are seldom considered in academic research or beyond and Islander youth, in particular, experience a certain sense of marginality when they visit and/or study in the UK, as a result of the perceived lack of knowledge about the Islands among British citizens (see Mycock, 2010) . The paper also reflects on how the perspectives of Islander youth on security and geopolitics can be marginalised and/or delegitimised given that they did not have direct experience of certain historical geopolitical events. At the same time, this lack of firsthand experience was underlined as something that enabled younger generations of Islanders to express alternative ideas about security and their hopes for future geopolitical relations with Argentina and other Latin American nations. By presenting the views of citizens from the Falkland Islands, then, this paper emphasises the importance of 'bringing in the voices of those usually rendered marginal and silent in other accounts' (Sharp, 2011, p. 271) .
S/security, youth and generation
Geographical theorising about security has, until very recently, been confined to the subdisciplines of political geography and critical geopolitics. These discussions have tended to evoke, 'an "establishment" discourse, bound up in the strategising of states and supra-state organisations, notably but not exclusively in (or headquartered in) the Global North when responding to so-called global "terror", "criminality" or "radicalisation"' (Philo, 2012, p. 1) .
The fact that it has been the subject of several special issues in Social and Cultural Geography is evidence of its broadening conceptual importance across the discipline and changing approaches to its understanding (see Philo, 2014) . Indeed, this is not to suggest that security has been absent from geographical research (as it has been central to research on, for example, the security of women, young people and children in public space, Valentine, 2001 Valentine, , 2004 but that its theorisation has been the subject of scholars investigating international relations and security. The nature of this work has seen, "'big-S" Security concerns…crowd out seemingly more mundane matters of "small-s" security, despite the fact that these two facets of S/security cannot but be closely inter-linked' (Philo, 2012, p. 2) .
These kinds of dichotomies have been critiqued by scholars engaging with feminist geopolitics in particular (Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001 ) who have looked to, 'disrupt the boundaries and scales of the geopolitical in linking seemingly local phenomenon and experiences…with wider geopolitical processes and discourses of securitisation, disrupting overly simplistic global/local binaries' (Williams & Massaro, 2013, p. 752-3) . In so doing they have teased out, 'the interweaving of global geopolitical machinations with the embodied experiences, emotions and agency of everyday peoples in everyday places' (Philo, 2012, p. 2) .
Critically, then, this is not a denial of the significance of Security discourses circulating at the macro-scale (i.e. by the state), rather an acknowledgement of 'the co-constitution of local, national and international politics' (Koch, 2011, p. 512; Bubandt, 2005) . It is an approach which recognises that, 'small acts and practices can make a difference; the materialities of local geographies can find their way into the circuits of high politics' (Pain & Smith, 2008, p. 14) . In this way, citizens, diplomats, politicians, prime ministers are all potential geopolitical agents, albeit with varying degrees of agency, who can shape understandings of, and policy responses to, things like (in)security (Hӧrschelmann, 2008a (Hӧrschelmann, , 2008b .
The turn to investigating the everyday as part of a critical geopolitics has prompted research with groups previously marginalised by geopolitical research (Hopkins, 2007; Hӧrschelmann, 2008a) . As Pain et al. (2010, p. 974) point out, 'the voices of young people have been perhaps most marginal of all within critical geopolitics. Relatively little is known about their views, feelings and political senses in relation to geopolitical events'. This is changing rapidly with the emergence of a body of work exploring the intersections between critical geopolitics, childhood and youth (e.g. Benwell & Hopkins, 2016; Kallio & Häkli, 2013; Leonard, 2013; Marshall, 2013; Skelton, 2010 Skelton, , 2013 . This research avoids conceptualising the politics of childhood and youth in limited ways as only engaging with local, neighbourhood environments which have received the bulk of academic attention from children's and young people's geographies (Ansell, 2009; Hopkins & Alexander, 2010; Katz, 2004) . Rather, it has started to recognise the agency of children and youth in relation to global political events and processes, despite the persistent tendency 'to discount the "political child" who speaks out against war, injustice or environmental degradation as naïve, or idealistic' (Ruddick, 2007, p. 516) . Young citizens, therefore, have 'an ability to critique and subvert political discourses rarely recognised in debates on youth political agency and even in research on popular geopolitics' (Hӧrschelmann, 2008b, p. 140 ; although critical debates about the definitions and limitations of this youthful agency are now emerging, see Bordonaro & Payne, 2012; Jeffrey, 2012; Punch & Tisdall, 2012; Vanderbeck, 2008) . This paper explores the perspectives of youth from the Falkland Islands, alongside those of adult Islanders, in relation to their sense of (in)security as a result of the ongoing sovereignty dispute between the UK, Argentina and the Islands. It identifies Islander youth as agents of (in)security who in diverse ways make their voices heard and seek to influence geopolitical debates and foreign policy (see Skelton, 2005) . Despite this, the sense of marginality is palpable among Falkland Islanders, young and old, who regularly express frustration at being ignored as part of a dispute in which Argentina insists on entering into diplomatic dialogue with the UK alone (although the FIG and the Islanders are undertaking diplomacy in increasingly confident and creative ways, see Benwell, 2016b; Pinkerton & Benwell, 2014) .
Furthermore, writing about British OTs like the Falkland Islands, most especially on the subject of geopolitics and security, has tended to circumvent the voices of citizens living in these territories, while exploring Security through the geopolitical practices, representations and strategies of states and their politicians (see Clegg & Gold, 2011; Dodds, 2012 Dodds, , 2013 Dodds & Hemmings, 2014) . So, Basham's (2015) insightful paper on how Argentine and British politicians are framing national identity, sovereignty and security, focuses on the configuration of political discourses crafted outside of the Falkland Islands. As she points out, there is scope for exploring how young citizens in Argentina, the Falkland Islands and the UK understand past and present conflicts associated with this specific sovereignty dispute (although see Benwell, 2014a Benwell, , 2016a Benwell, , 2016c Benwell & Dodds, 2011) . This paper, therefore, presents a conceptual, empirical and methodological challenge to normative framings of geopolitics and security that tend to dominate popular and academic commentary associated the, 'Falklands lobby used short-hand references such as 'loyal' and 'kith and kin'…not only to rail against Argentina but protest against its systematic exclusion as British subjects' (Dodds, 2002, p. 137) . This was a period marked by sovereignty negotiations between the governments of Argentina and the UK (conducted against the wishes of the Falkland Islands) and a prevailing sense that Islanders were second-class citizens, compounded by the fact that they were not afforded British citizenship (this was subsequently granted in 1983, one year after the Falklands War, see González, 2013) . The Islanders are consistently acknowledged by Dodds as active geopolitical agents through their involvement in certain rituals of commemoration and events (including the visits of British politicians) where they looked to perform their Britishness, yet the voices of citizens are largely absent (also see Lambert, 2005; Dodds et al., 2007; Mycock, 2010) . Dodds (2002) Islands. This hostility, enacted militarily and more recently diplomatically, is understood here to assure support from the British government, reaffirming the Islands' consistent identification with the UK (as guarantors of the right to self-determine their future), and the desire to have this allegiance 'recognised and affirmed by others' (Innes & Steele, 2014, p. 15 ). This paper, nevertheless, seeks to problematise simplistic theorisations of ontological security that have tended to extrapolate its psychological dimensions in relation to individuals (see Giddens, 1991; Philo, 2014) , to debates about the security of states and their citizenry (e.g. Mitzen, 2006; Innes & Steele, 2014; Kinnvall, 2002; Rumelili, 2015a; Skey, 2010) . The conceptual origins of ontological security have been ascribed to the psychoanalytical work of Laing (1960, p. 39) who suggested that an 'ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life…from a centrally firm sense of his [sic] own and other people's reality and identity'. Conversely, an individual can experience ontological insecurity when such assurances are absent leading to, 'a fear of discontinuity of understandable life and being "paralysed" by a preoccupation with potential risks to existence without an ability to trust in the self or others for protection' (Botterill et al., 2016, p. 126 ). Giddens' (1991) sociological application of ontological (in)security examines how individuals seek coherence, continuity and meaning in light of broader changes to social life in the modern era (see Kinnvall, 2016) .
The rather crude transference of these ideas about ontological (in)security onto 'the state' (and by association its citizens), in ways that elide differences between psychological and geopolitical framings of security, is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is characterised by an underlying essentialism that overlooks the different ways people living within a state can experience (in)security (see Botterill et al., 2016) . Secondly, the personification of the state that is inherent to such framings of ontological security reproduces the rather abstract and state-centric focus that more recent interventions on security and feminist geopolitics have looked to critique (e.g. Philo, 2014; Williams & Massaro, 2013) . So, for instance, Mitzen (2006, p. 342) contends that, 'states might actually come to prefer their ongoing, certain conflict to the unsettling condition of deep uncertainty'.
Similarly, Kinvall (2002, p. 86) shows how, 'a large group unconsciously defines its identity by the transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the memories of the ancestors' trauma'. While there is a large body of work on intergenerational memory and its role in reinforcing narratives of the state, it is clear that the transmission of memory and its multiple meanings cannot be taken for granted and are subject to dispute, conflict, struggle and negotiation (e.g. Assmann, 2010; Benwell, 2016a; Edkins, 2003; Hirsch, 2012; Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003; Jelin, 2003; Jelin and Kaufman, 2000; Rothberg, 2009; Tyner et al., 2012) .
In this paper, I engage with theorisations of ontological security at the level of the state, but am more interested in keeping 'the concept…close to the immediacy of grounded bodies/selves' (Philo, 2014, p.289) . Influenced by recent geographical work on emotional geopolitics and security (Pain, 2009) , I focus on the scalar intersections between state conceptualisations of ontological (in)security and the everyday experiences of (in)security of Falkland Islanders. In particular, the paper contributes to theorisations of ontological security by illustrating how citizen's perspectives on geopolitics and (in)security can be shaped by generation. Existing work on ontological security has either been blind to generation as a social variable or made assumptions about how it might shape experiences of (in)security. While Rumelili's (2015a) collection draws attention to the heterogeneous effects of ontological security and the changing nature of conflicts, very little reference is made to generational differences within the societies examined (see Becker, 2014 for a notable exception).
The recognition that 'each generation is located within its social, political and economic milieu' (Wyn & Woodman, 2006, p. 497) , has been typically employed by scholars of Youth Studies to consider how 'young lives are being changed alongside large-scale transformations in education, work and relationship formation in many parts of the globe' (Woodman & Wyn, 2015, p. 1) . However, others have cautioned against generational essentialism that might lead to overly crude distinctions being constructed between age groups. Notwithstanding the fact that, 'members of an historical cohort may experience the same events, these experiences will not impinge on them in the same way' (McLeod & Thomson, 2009, p. 110 ). Mannheim's (1952) influential study has been used to argue against simplistic framings of generational difference and hierarchy, by emphasising the (intergenerational) interactions and continuities between generational groups, as well as the diversity and agency of individuals. So, for instance, Richardson's (2016) work has shown the importance of considering family circumstances and intergenerational relationships, in understanding how gender is conceptualised by different generations of Irish men. Hopkins et al. (2011) , through their research on the formation of youthful religiosities among Scottish Christians, dispute the notion that 'intergenerational relationships are dominated by unidirectional handing down of religious ideas and practices from an older generation to a new one', preferring to emphasise a 'fluid field of transmission' (Hopkins et al., 2011, p. 325) . In this way, young people were influenced by, and could in turn influence, the religiosities of their friends and adults across a range of everyday geographies. This approach acknowledges that the 'identities of children and others are produced through interactions with other age/generational groups and are in a constant state of flux' (Hopkins & Pain, 2007, p. 289; Vanderbeck 2007) .
Such conceptualisations of generation have rarely been used to think about variations in citizen's perspectives of geopolitics and (in)security (although see Pain et al., 2010) . This paper engages with two different cohorts of Falkland Islanders born before and after the 1982 war, to outline the importance of considering generation in their framings of the contemporary geopolitics of the Falklands. In similar ways to the research discussed here, the paper does not essentialise generation as the single factor determining the geopolitical subjectivities of different groups of citizens from the Falkland Islands. Instead, it shows how young Falkland Islanders can respond, contest and shape debates concerning the geopolitical relations that characterise their lives (and those of their forebears), through online engagements with social media, for instance. Youth, then, can be considered as agents of (in)security with the capacity to formulate ideas about security, influenced by memories of past geopolitical events, but also contextualised within the dynamics of contemporary international relations (Benwell, 2016b; Berliner, 2005; Becker, 2014; Habashi, 2013) .
Methodology
The research presented in this paper is drawn from ethnographic and interview data collected in the UK and the Falkland Islands from 2011-2015. The research design identified the value of in-depth qualitative research in teasing out some of the everyday ways that geopolitics is lived and experienced by citizens. Clearly, the small-scale nature of this study cannot purport to give generalizable insights into the views of all Falkland Islanders, rather the value of such work lies in the diversity and depth of perspectives that can be examined and reflected upon.
The first phase of the study sought to explore the perspectives and emotions of Falkland Islander youth in relation to the geopolitics of the South Atlantic and, more specifically, the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. The theme of (in)security was frequently raised by the youth respondents as a result of broader geopolitical tensions with Argentina that coincided with the period of research. Many of the Islander youth interviewed were actively engaging with geopolitics and associated themes of (in)security in some way. This engagement ranged Critical considerations of positionality are necessary when undertaking any qualitative research and this study was no exception (Rose, 1993) . My identity as a British national (alongside gender, ethnicity, generation and so on) conducting research on/in the Falkland Islands was regularly reflected on in my field diary and is explored in greater depth elsewhere (Benwell, 2014b) . There is a risk that island communities are framed as a curiosity to be 'gazed' at by more mobile, 'cosmopolitan' academic researchers, so careful thought went into how the research was introduced and the phrasing of interview questions (Smith, 2010) . In the case of interviews conducted via Skype, email correspondence and informal conversation before the interview were important ways to establish rapport with respondents and ensure they felt comfortable discussing geopolitically sensitive topics (Madge, 2010; Tarrant, 2013) .
Considering generation and everyday ontological (in)security
During the Kirchner presidencies of Néstor and Cristina Fernández (2003-2015) , Argentina off again re-united everybody and I think it did everybody a world of good. And we have never been so well off as now. And we can go to bed and realise that we are going to stay British now, because everybody is on our side. But it took a lot of convincing, in fact in the end it took an invasion to actually do it. But good on the British as far as I am concerned.' (Interview with Wilfred, 78 years old, 3 February 2015)
The 1982 war was clearly understood as a turning point in securing British commitment to the Falkland Islands, yet memories of the uncertainty that marked the decades preceding it were perhaps more significant in shaping how adults framed the contemporary security situation of the Islands and relations with/between the UK and Argentina. While Islander youth were also reassured by the strong political support the Islands received from the UK (and actively looked to ensure that this level of support was maintained, as I explore in the next section), their ways of referring to relations with Argentina were noticeably different to the accounts of adults discussed above.
Whereas adults were quick to point out the improved political, economic and security situation of the Islands relative to the 1960s and 70s, Islander youth tended to express a range of emotions that emphasised their anxiety with what they considered as the increasingly aggressive tactics of Argentina (Pain et al., 2010) : 'I really, really wish that they would just give it up and just stop it because they're making life difficult, not just for us, but for themselves. And, yes, they're causing issues with shipping links and air links…I still feel a bit threatened by the Argentina situation, because we are a very small place, and we're a very long way away from good friends.' Although Islander youth were reassured by the presence of the British armed forces, some of those interviewed were acutely sensitive to how this defence commitment was understood and framed in the international media:
'Everyone kind of thinks, "Oh militarisation of the south Atlantic, it's a NATO base, it's a huge strategic place". And it just isn't! Regardless of how crippled the Argentine military is at the moment, if they sent everything they had to the Falklands 2,000 people in the MPA [RAF Mount Pleasant] can't defeat that. They can try and they can hold stuff at bay, but 30,000 verses 2,000 isn't really going to go very far. So it is just there as the minimum required to be a deterrent relative to how much of a threat we think Argentina presents. If we actually thought Argentina weren't going to invade tomorrow, we probably wouldn't have as big a base as we do. It's also really good for strategic (although this did not make progress towards the solution of the sovereignty dispute, see Dodds & Manóvil, 2001) . However, the turn of the century saw Argentina harden its policy towards the Falklands, invoking feelings of insecurity for Islander youth in particular, despite the reassuring presence of the British military.
Youth as agents of (in)security
Sharp's (2011) work on subaltern geopolitics underscores marginal voices and their role in forming resistant or alternative imaginaries relative to dominant geopolitics. Moreover, her work picks apart the sometimes ambiguous relationships that marginal groups can have with dominant geopolitical structures and can be usefully applied to the everyday geopolitics of youth from the Falkland Islands. On the one hand, Islander youth underlined the agency and 'independence' enjoyed by their postcolonial generation (relative to the colonial era when Islanders were framed as more submissive) and yet, on the other hand, referred to occasions when they were required to 'perform' their Britishness in certain ways that reinforced notions of Falklands' dependence on the UK: 'I always think with the Falklands, my parents' generation, they come from the colonial times when basically they were told what to do, they didn't have a choice… But then you've got my generation, which is the first real generation when people have… We've lived and studied in another country. We don't have that inferiority complex that comes with living under colonial rule, which a lot of people my parent's age have.' (Interview with Amy, 27 years old, 10 February 2013) 'I think there's a worry that if people stop their being British, yes-we're-really-British, thing in the Islands, then the UK government will forget about us, and be just like, oh, they're not that bothered, and hand us back over.' (Interview with Emma, 21 years old,
April 2011)
Islander youth considered their generation as more connected and confident when compared with preceding generations that had lived under British colonial rule (as opposed to living in a British OT). Nevertheless, they still remained conscious of their reliance on a larger collective for their security, manifest through the permanent presence of the British armed forces in the Falklands. The continuation of this military presence was framed as being dependent on the support of the British government of the day and its electorate, and in order to maintain this link Islander youth like Emma were conscious of the need to remind external audiences of their British identity (Edensor, 2002; Weber, 1998) .
The 2013 referendum on the political status of the Falkland Islands was a key moment that was harnessed by citizens, young and old, to explicitly project their sense of British identity (Dodds & Pinkerton, 2013; Niebieskikwiat, 2014, p. 32) . Indeed, some community leaders in Similarly, Islander youth were acutely sensitive of the need to perform their nationality and loyalty to the UK (Dodds et al., 2007) . This imperative was a consequence of uneasy contemporary relations with Argentina but also how the Falklands War was remembered and commemorated in the Islands. Islanders of all ages regularly take part in evocative commemorative activities that remember the sacrifices made by British soldiers to secure the future and 'freedom' of the Falkland Islands (Benwell, 2016a) . These kinds of rituals are when the Falklands community are overtly reminded of their connections to the UK and the British military, given that more formal commemorations involve regiments stationed in the Islands. Many other youth respondents were active more informally through their use of social networking websites like Twitter and Facebook, disseminating information about the Islands among their friends and followers, as well as countering perceived inaccuracies about their lives or the sovereignty dispute that they encountered online (Pinkerton & Benwell, 2014) .
Some talked about their use of British and Falkland Island flags as cover photos or profile pictures on their accounts as a way to further display their national allegiances (many of the respondents self-identified as Falkland Islanders and British). Islander youth, then, recognised the potential geopolitical ramifications of declining British interest in the Falklands and, thus, considered awareness-raising, especially when they were in the UK, as highly important. The concerns were not without historical precedent given the build-up to the Falklands War, and Islanders' fears that political commitment was dwindling amongst officials in Whitehall; fears that were subsequently realised when Argentina invaded in 1982 (Dodds, 2002) .
The sense of marginality felt by Islander youth in relation to the dominant geopolitics of the South Atlantic extended to their everyday experiences in the Falkland Islands. In the interviews, youth referred to how their perspectives on geopolitics and security were framed as inconsequential, compared to those who experienced the war first-hand. The emphasis placed on youth in recent government initiatives including the #MyVoiceMatters campaign and diplomatic visits described above, suggest that this attitude is starting to change as Jackie explained:
'I think the youth sometimes feel that, I used to feel that I didn't really have, couldn't really have that much of an input if that makes sense? I know like I wasn't here during the war and so politically I had obviously heard about it through my parents and grandparents and things. And although I had my own opinion on things, I felt a lot of the time that perhaps my opinion wasn't quite as important as those who had obviously lived through it all. And I think that is something that is disappearing now. The youth can have their own opinion on these sorts of things. But when it is so close, you are constantly surrounded by it. There are memorials everywhere, there is [sic.] minefields everywhere, you are so close to it all…So do you know what I mean? Being surrounded by it all the time people used to be afraid, when they were younger, to make their opinions known, whereas now we are realising that actually our opinions are just as valid as everybody else's and that we can make that opinion known.' (Interview with Jackie, aged 26, 10 February 2015)
There was a perception amongst Islander youth that the legitimacy afforded to their perspectives had shifted significantly in recent years. This may have been a result of enough time passing since the 1982 war, the event that has so often marked the Falkland Islands and its international profile and relations. More important, I would argue, are the changing ways youth have been enrolled in government-led diplomacy and the ways they are now able to express their views using online social networks.
Many of the youth respondents involved in this research were active in the doing of 'diplomacy', whether that was manifest through their use of the internet, daily interactions with British citizens or activities alongside the FIG and related support groups based in the UK. In particular, as agents of (in)security they were acutely aware of which audiences they wished to reach and influence. Most significant amongst these were British politicians and the electorate upon whom Falkland Islanders relied for continued diplomatic support and the provision of the Islands' military deterrent. On the one hand, this larger collective provided security and reassurance for the youth respondents, yet on the other, the dependency generated a sense of unease and insecurity. For these reasons, Islander youth consciously Corbyn, has touted a different diplomatic approach that encompasses 'sensible dialogue' with Argentina regarding the sovereignty question (Hope & Hughes, 2016) . Notwithstanding its largely negative reception, most especially among politicians in the Falklands and the UK (The Guardian, 2016), it will serve as a reminder to the Islanders of the intersections between (geo)politics in the UK and the South Atlantic and the potential ramifications of an alternative British government (Mycock, 2010) .
Conclusion
The rarely documented voices of youth from a British OT have been the principal focus of this paper building on a limited body of existing scholarship that has examined the (geo)politics of these territories (e.g. Clegg & Gold, 2011; Dodds, 2002; Lambert, 2005; Pinkerton, 2008) .
Instead of focusing on debates about (in)security and the Falkland Islands through the analysis of practical and formal geopolitical discourse, it has centred attention on the voices and emotions of those who live and experience (in)security in this British OT. The extracts from the youth respondents illustrate their sense of belonging and (in)security in the context of changing postcolonial connections between British OTs, the UK, and neighbouring nationstates. Young Falkland Islanders had equally complex, yet entirely distinctive, political geographies compared to their counterparts in the British OT of Montserrat (Skelton, 2005) , illustrating the need to avoid broad generalisations about the citizens of these historically, geographically, (geo)politically and culturally diverse territories. The sense of being caught in the middle was palpable for Islander youth as they came to terms with the historical and contemporary geopolitical relations of the South Atlantic, so often dominated by the UK and Argentina.
The analysis of the perspectives of older Islanders has enabled the paper to contrast how references to (in)security and relations with Argentina can vary generationally. In a theoretical sense, this contributes to debates about ontological security that have been rather blind to generational nuance and tended to conflate security of the state with the security of its citizens. For older Islanders, with memories of the unsettling period of Anglo-Argentine diplomacy that marked the 1960s and 70s, there was a certain ontological security provided by overt confrontation with Argentina. The 1982 war and the tensions that have characterised relations with Argentina over the last 12 years have guaranteed the support of the British government and set up Argentina as a consistent threat and other. Of course, Islander youth were well aware of the memories of the Falklands War, given that these were relayed to them through commemorative practices and intergenerational exchanges with teachers, parents and other adults (Benwell, 2016a) . They were also conscious of the perceived authority that this gave those with direct experiences of historical events in the Falklands to speak about geopolitics and security, relative to their own. The past and present overlap in young people's readings of, and emotional responses to, geopolitics (Mitchell and Elwood, 2013) and as Rumelili (2015b, p. 18 ) points out, 'ontological security is not only produced through domestic social and political processes but also constituted via intersubjective expectations and understandings'. In other words, experiences of ontological security may not always be clearly 
